CASE COMMENTARIES
EMPLOYMENT
The Tennessee Court of Appeals determined that “but-for”
causation is the proper standard of causation for retaliation claims
under the Tennessee Human Rights Act. Goree v. UPS, Inc., 490
S.W.3d 413 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015).
By Logan Burnette
In Goree v. UPS, Inc., 490 S.W.3d 413 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015), the
Tennessee Court of Appeals addressed claims of racial discrimination
and retaliation made by two employees of the United Parcel Service
(“UPS”) under the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”), codified at
Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-101, et seq. Specifically, the Court of Appeals
decided the proper standard of causation for retaliation claims under the
THRA is the “but-for” standard.
Plaintiffs Mitch Goree (“Goree”) and James Wherry (“Wherry”)
are both African-American employees for UPS. Prior to the lawsuit,
both men worked at UPS for over thirty years. In 2000, Goree was
promoted to the position of business manager. Goree was later demoted
from his position as business manager and, in 2004, filed a lawsuit
against UPS alleging racial discrimination. The suit was eventually
dismissed, and Goree continued to work for UPS. In 2006, Wherry was
promoted to division manager for UPS and supervised business
managers in a given area.
In 2010, Wherry asked Goree to serve as acting business
manager at the Walnut Grove packing center until the position could be
permanently filled. In August 2010, Goree and Wherry had lunch with
Wherry’s superior, James Buchanan, to discuss the still-vacant business
manager position at the Walnut Grove facility. Goree alleges that at this
lunch, Buchanan assured Goree that he would be promoted to the
position of business manager. However, Buchanan later announced that
Brian Riley, a white male, would transfer from another facility and
become the business manager for the Walnut Grove facility. Goree
immediately left UPS and took six months of “stress leave” in order to
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deal with the overwhelming embarrassment and humiliation he felt due
to not receiving the promotion.
Wherry was demoted to business manager in 2011 when a UPS
internal investigation revealed that Wherry was responsible for the
improper termination of an employee under the collective bargaining
agreement between UPS and the teamsters’ union. In response to these
adverse employment actions, Goree and Wherry filed a lawsuit in 2011
claiming that UPS discriminated and retaliated against each of them on
the basis of race in violation of the THRA.
Under the THRA, it is an impermissible discriminatory practice
for an employer to “discriminate against an individual with respect to
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of
an individual’s race . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-401(a)(1).
Additionally, it is also unlawful for employers to “[r]etaliate or
discriminate in any manner against a person because such person has
opposed a practice declared discriminatory . . . or because such a person
made a charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted or participated in any
manner in any investigation, proceeding or hearing . . . .” Tenn. Code
Ann. § 4-21-301(a)(1).
There are four elements to establish discrimination and
retaliation claims under THRA. A plaintiff must show that: 1) “he is a
member of a protected class;” 2) “he applied and was qualified for a
position for which the employer was seeking applicants;” 3) “he was
subjected to adverse employment action;” and 4) “the rejection occurred
under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination.” To establish a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show
that: 1) “he engaged in activity protected by the THRA;” 2) “the exercise
of his protected rights was known to the defendant;” 3) “the defendant
thereafter took a materially adverse action against him;” and 4) there was
a causal connection between the protected activity and the materially
adverse action.”
The trial court found that both Goree and Wherry had
sufficiently proven all the elements of both their discrimination and
retaliation claims respectively. Furthermore, the district court dismissed
UPS’s motion for directed verdict at the close of trial. UPS appealed to
the Tennessee Court of Appeals.
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On appeal, the court upheld Goree’s claim of racial
discrimination for failure to promote. Goree was able to provide
sufficient circumstantial evidence to create an inference of discrimination
by demonstrating that he was more qualified than Riley and that the
nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse employment decision
provided by UPS were merely pretexts for racial discrimination.
The Court of Appeals also upheld Goree’s claim that UPS’s
failure to promote him was in retaliation for his 2005 lawsuit alleging
racial discrimination. Goree demonstrated a causal connection between
his protected activity of filing a discrimination complaint in 2005 and his
failure to be promoted in 2010 by offering direct evidence that the
district president of UPS told Wherry that employees with histories of
litigation against UPS were not promoted. In an issue of first
impression, the court adopted the reasoning set forth in the United
States Supreme Court decision of University of Texas Southwestern Medical
Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013), by establishing a “but-for”
causation standard for retaliation claims filed under the THRA. Under
this standard, the plaintiff must show that the protected activity was the
determinative factor in the defendant’s decision to perform the
retaliatory adverse employment action.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision
regarding Wherry’s claim of racial discrimination based on his demotion.
The court held that Wherry could not sustain an inference of
discrimination by failing to show an analogous example of a UPS
employee in Wherry’s position who engaged in the same conduct, yet
was treated more favorably than Wherry.
As a result, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s
decision regarding Wherry’s claim for retaliation based on his demotion.
Wherry had not previously filed a complaint against UPS, and his only
protected activity under THRA was supporting Goree to be the Walnut
Grove business manager. While support for Goree was sufficient for
Wherry to claim engagement in a protected activity, Wherry did not
provide sufficient evidence to sustain the required but-for causal link
between his protected activity and his demotion.
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In light of this decision, Tennessee labor and employment
attorneys should take note of how the Goree court applied the THRA
within the retaliation context, especially as it concerns the newly adopted
“but-for” causation standard regarding the link between protected
activity and adverse employment action in retaliation claims. It is not
enough for a plaintiff to simply show that they engaged in a protected
activity, and later that they experienced an adverse employment action.
Plaintiffs must show that, were it not for their participation in the
protected action, they would have been promoted. Finally, the case
provides an example of the danger an employer risks when they consider
an employee’s litigation history in determining whether or not to
promote.

REAL ESTATE
The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that notice of a tax sale is
not required for parties designated as nominees. Mortg. Elec.
Registration Sys., Inc. v. Ditto, 488 S.W.3d 265 (Tenn. 2015).
By Kane Shepherd
In Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Ditto, the Supreme Court of
Tennessee addressed—as an issue of first impression—whether due
process compelled notice to be given to petitioner Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”). The Hamilton County Chancery
Court (“trial court”) held that MERS did not have an interest in the
property sold at a tax sale to defendant purchaser, Carlton Ditto
(“Ditto”), meaning that notice was not required. The Court of Appeals
affirmed, albeit for a different reason, holding that MERS had no
standing to file suit because it had not suffered any injury. Mortg. Elec.
Registration Sys., Inc. v. Ditto, No. E2012–02292–COA–R3–CV, 2014 WL
24439, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2014). The Tennessee Supreme
Court granted certiorari and held that MERS had no interest in the
property and thus did not require notice of the sale.
This case arose from a tax sale of property located in Chattanooga,
Tennessee. The original owners, Joseph and Gerald Dossett, borrowed
approximately $60,000 from Choice Capital Funding, Inc. (“Choice
Capital”) to purchase the property in 2006. The deed of trust (“DOT”)
associated with the loan listed Choice Capital as the lender, and also
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described MERS as “a separate corporation that is acting solely as
nominee for [Choice Capital].” The DOT also stated that MERS was
“the beneficiary under this Security Instrument . . . .” MERS is a
national registry system that tracks changes in ownership interests of
mortgage loans, allowing lenders to avoid the payment of recording fees
each time interests in the loans are transferred.
The Dossetts failed to pay property taxes on the property in 2006, and
Hamilton County filed a delinquent tax lawsuit against them in 2008.
While Choice Capital received notice of the tax sale, the county made no
attempt to give MERS notice of the lawsuit despite it being referenced in
the public record. The Dossetts never paid the 2006 property taxes, and
the property was sold to Ditto in 2010 at a tax sale. MERS brought suit
in 2012, alleging that it had a constitutionally protected right in the
property through the DOT and thus should have received notice of the
tax sale based on the constitutional requirement of due process. Ditto
and Hamilton County argued that the DOT gave MERS no interest in
the property, meaning that the notice requirement did not apply, and
claimed that MERS’ own policy gave all rights associated with property
interests to lenders.
The trial court ruled for Ditto and Hamilton County, holding that the
county had complied with the notice requirements of both the DOT and
the tax sale statute because neither mentioned the means by which notice
should be given to MERS. After reviewing cases from other
jurisdictions, as well as the language of the DOT, the trial court also held
that MERS had no “interest” in the property because it had no power to
lend to, or collect money from, the borrower, and played a limited role.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, but on somewhat different grounds,
emphasizing MERS’ status as a “nominee,” meaning that it had limited
rights with respect to the loan interests that it tracked. Since MERS
could only be considered a nominee, the appellate court determined that
MERS did not suffer any injury with respect to the tax sale and thus had
no standing to file suit.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed both lower courts’ decisions
that MERS did not have a protected interest in the property. In
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affirming the decision that MERS did not have an interest in the
property, the Supreme Court of Tennessee agreed with the trial court
that the question should focus on the “interest” question itself, and not
whether MERS suffered an “injury,” as the Court of Appeals did.
Looking at the rights granted to MERS by the DOT, the court
acknowledged the language seemed to be contradictory. The DOT
indicated that MERS acted “solely as the nominee for the lender,” but at
the same time labelled MERS as a “beneficiary” and allowed it to
“exercise some rights of the lender,” if necessary. Because the issue of
MERS’ interest in property had not been decided in Tennessee, the court
pointed to Landmark National Bank v. Kesler, 216 P.3d 158, 167 (Kan.
2009), for a case containing similar DOT language. The court observed
that there, the Supreme Court of Kansas held MERS to simply be an
“agent” or “straw man” for a lender, meaning that it could not have a
real interest in property. Likewise, the court cited Culhane v. Aurora Loan
Services. of Nebraska, 826 F. Supp. 2d 352, 370 (D. Mass. 2011), in which
the court considered it “absurd” for MERS to think it could act both as a
mortgagee and an agent for lenders simultaneously.
Considering these and related cases, the court determined that MERS
could not be considered a “beneficiary” for purposes of having a
protected property interest. The court again emphasized the language of
the DOT that deemed that MERS acted “solely as nominee” and found
that this language meant that the DOT intended MERS to act in a
limited way, given the very definition of the word “nominee.”
Furthermore, the court observed that the notice provision of the DOT
did not mention MERS, suggesting that MERS acted merely as “an agent
with limited powers, akin to a special power of attorney,” and that it
could not have a protected interest in the property.
The Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision follows the line of reasoning
set forth in other cases involving MERS. While this represents the first
case involving MERS’ interest in property in Tennessee, other courts
have widely held that MERS does not have the rights of a lender, and
instead is a nominee that tracks ownership interests in loans as they
change hands.
While the issue of MERS claiming to have a protected interest in
property may still be an open issue in many jurisdictions, the supreme
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court’s decision should mean that MERS’ role is more clearly defined in
Tennessee. Tax sale buyers, holders of mortgage loan interests, and
practitioners should not have to be as concerned that MERS may try to
exercise the rights of a lender. At the very least, the court’s decision
encourages clarity in deeds of trust that involve MERS. It may inspire
such documents to be worded in a way that leaves no question that third
parties like MERS cannot claim to have an interest in property. Finally,
the supreme court’s decision helps promote the increasing fluidity of
mortgage loan interests, ensuring that they may be transferred more
easily without lenders wondering what interests MERS may attempt to
claim.

UTILITIES
The United States Supreme Court upheld the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission’s authority to regulate demand response
transactions. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016).
By David Large
In FERC v. Electric Power Supply Association, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016), the
United States Supreme Court addressed two distinct issues surrounding
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and its practice of
“demand response,” which compensates consumers for conserving
electric energy during specific times. First, the Court questioned whether
the Federal Power Act (FPA) permits the practice of “demand
response,” and second, whether FERC’s decision to compensate
demand response providers and electricity producers the same rate was
arbitrary and capricious. This action was brought by the respondent
Electric Power Supply Association (EPSA), a national trade association
representing competitive power suppliers, including generators and
marketers, against FERC.
The FPA was passed by Congress in 1935 for the purpose of regulating
“the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.” 16
U.S.C. § 824 et seq. The act was passed in response to electric power
generation and distribution becoming increasingly national in scope.
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The FPA charges FERC with “oversee[ing] all prices for … interstate
transactions and all rules and practices affecting such prices.”
FERC has shifted the practice of electric energy sales from a
monopolistic model to one driven by markets, though this presents
numerous challenges. Electricity cannot be effectively stored so
generators of power must produce the exact amount of energy needed
every minute. To do this, nonprofit entities were created to manage
wholesale markets on a regional basis. These market operators receive
demand schedules from load-serving entities (LSEs) “that buy power at
wholesale for resale to [end] users” and take “bids from generators
specifying how much electricity they can produce at those times and how
much they will charge for it.” The market operators then fill the quantity
of power demanded by accepting bids in ascending order. The largest
bid that is accepted is then “paid to every supplier whose bid was
accepted.” This price point is, to use an economic term, the marginal
cost, hereafter referred to as the “locational marginal price” (LMP).
Another challenge for FERC is the inelasticity of demand for electric
power. When temperatures rise, everyone consumes more power
because they have no incentive to refrain from such activity, and there is
no reasonable alternative. Approximately fifteen years ago, wholesale
market operators, in conjunction with FERC, combatted this problem by
employing the practice of “wholesale demand response,” which “pays
consumers for commitments to curtail their use of power, so as to curb
wholesale rates and prevent grid breakdowns.” Similar to the auction
process described above, large individual users “submit bids to decrease
… consumption.” The market operators will accept any bid that is
under the LMP, because, if the LMP is $40, rather than having to
produce one additional unit at $41 they can pay the consumer $40 to
refrain from consuming this additional unit. In 2011, FERC issued the
“rule under review here” where they required wholesale market
operators, “under two specified conditions, to pay LMP for any accepted
demand response bid, just as they do for successful supply bids.” These
two conditions are simply that the consumer actually be able to reduce
consumption by the amount suggested and that paying LMP for a bid
will save LSEs money.

2016]

CASE COMMENTARIES

303

At trial, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
vacated the Rule as “ultra vires agency action.” The court held that
“FERC lacked authority to issue the Rule,” because the practice of
demand response enticed retail consumers into the wholesale market,
and as a result, the Rule “engages in ‘direct regulation of the retail
market.’” In addition, the Court of Appeals held “that the Rule [was]
arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act,
because FERC failed to ‘adequately explain’ why paying LMP to demand
response providers ‘results in just compensation.’” The court suggested,
as others previously had, that by providing full LMP to demand response
providers, these providers were experiencing a “windfall by leaving them
with ‘the full LMP plus . . . the savings associated with’ reduced
consumption.” The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed both holdings by a count of 6-2.
The Supreme Court undertook a three-part analysis to make a ruling on
these issues. First, the Court determined that demand response did, in
fact, “directly affect wholesale rates.” The goal of demand response is to
lower energy prices by preventing inefficiencies in the context of
wholesale markets. There is no indication to the contrary that the goal
of demand response is anything other than to lower the wholesale
market rate.
Second, the Court determined that this practice did not unjustly interfere
with retail electricity sales. The Court conceded that any action taken by
wholesale producers and purchasers has some effect on retail markets,
but it also stated that “whatever effects at the retail level, every aspect of
the regulatory plan happens exclusively on the wholesale market and
governs exclusively that market’s rules.” Any effect had on the retail
market is an inadvertent result of a practice focused exclusively on the
wholesale market.
Finally, the Court held that the decision to compensate demand response
providers at LMP was not “arbitrary and capricious.” When determining
whether a practice is arbitrary and capricious, “a court is not to ask
whether a regulatory decision is the best one possible or even whether it
is better than the alternatives.” It is only a matter of whether FERC has
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“examine[d] the relevant [considerations] and articulate[d] a satisfactory
explanation for its action[s].” In its explanation, FERC stated that the
level of profitability of each individual power plant is not relevant to the
matter. The purpose of paying LMP to demand response providers is
simply to incentivize “more efficient supply and demand decisions.”
Additionally, paying LMP can help demand response providers
overcome “significant start-up expenses” such as “the cost of installing
necessary metering technology and energy management systems.”
At its most basic level, this ruling incentivizes more participation in
demand response practices and results in cheaper wholesale electricity
costs. Entities situated to benefit from demand response will look to
increase participation by continually decreasing energy consumption. A
good attorney will also act as a risk manager in determining any potential
liabilities that could result from this cutback. For example, big-box
grocery stores would potentially open themselves up to food safety
issues, or a decrease in electricity consumption by a manufacturing plant
could potentially result in a product defect. Finally, an attorney
representing either party in a demand response transaction should be
aware of how this practice works in order to properly structure any
agreement between the parties to avoid any needless legal disputes.

FIDUCIARY DUTIES
The Supreme Court of the United States held that courts must
assess a party’s current complaint to determine whether a
reasonably prudent fiduciary could not conclude an alternative
action would do more harm than good. Amgen Inc. v. Harris, 136 S.
Ct. 758 (2016).
By Mila Yarbrough
In Amgen Inc. v. Harris, 136 S. Ct. 758 (2016), stockholders in an
employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) brought suit against plan
fiduciaries for breach of the duty of prudence under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et
seq. The United States Supreme Court clarified its holding in Fifth Third
Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459 (2014), which set the standard for
breach of the duty of prudence. In Amgen Inc., the Court held that a
complaint alleging a breach of the duty of prudence must present facts
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and allegations that support the proposition that a reasonably prudent
fiduciary could not have concluded that the alleged alternative action
would do more harm than good.
The case arose out of a class action between stockholders who were
former Amgen Inc. employees and Amgen Inc. (“Amgen”) fiduciaries.
While employed by Amgen, the stockholders were eligible for and held
individual ESOPs, which gave stockholders the opportunity to purchase
ownership in Amgen’s stock and were managed by the fiduciaries. In
2007, the value of Amgen stock fell, and, believing the fiduciaries were
not protecting their interests, the stockholders filed a class action against
the fiduciaries for an alleged breach of fiduciary duties under ERISA.
The district court granted the fiduciaries’ motion to dismiss, holding the
fiduciaries did not breach their duties, including the duty of prudence.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court vacated and
remanded the Ninth Circuit’s judgment in light of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459 (2014). On
remand, the Ninth Circuit reversed again the district court’s dismissal of
the complaint, and the fiduciaries again sought certiorari from the
Supreme Court.
Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer detailed three factors for the breach of
the duty of prudence. First, there must be alternative action that the
defendant could have taken. Second, that alternative action must comply
with securities laws. Third, a prudent fiduciary, under the same
circumstances, would not view the alternative action as more likely to
harm the fund than to benefit it. The Amgen Inc. Court clarified the third
element by stating that ultimately, the complaint, in its current form,
should plausibly allege a prudent fiduciary, in the same position, could
not conclude the alternative action would do more harm. There, the
complaint was lacking in plausible allegations to that effect, and the
Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit had not engaged in proper
analysis of the complaint. When applying the facts—as alleged in the
complaint—to the rule, the Ninth Circuit only used the first two factors
from Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer. Although the first two factors
were satisfied, the third factor was not because the stockholder’s
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complaint itself did not contain any facts or allegations to show that
there was an alternative action that satisfied Fifth Third’s standards.
In sum, in Amgen Inc. v. Harris, the Supreme Court of the United States
clarified the third factor, in conjunction with the first two, that is
necessary to allege a breach of duty of prudence; the Supreme Court held
that courts must assess a party’s current complaint to determine whether
a reasonably prudent fiduciary could not have concluded that the alleged
alternative action would do more harm than good.
The Court’s clarification of Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer ultimately
places a heavier burden on stockholders or individuals who allege that
ERISA fiduciaries have breached their duty of prudence. Although
more work for stockholders, the Court has a strong interest in enforcing
this policy because Congress strives to encourage employees to purchase
ownership in stock. In order for stock-ownership in ESOPs to thrive,
stockholders cannot allege a breach of prudence each time the value of
stock drops, for stockholders must understand the risk they take on
when they agree to purchase ownership of a company’s stock.

GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
The Sixth Circuit limited the government’s recovery under the
False Claims Act to treble the difference between what the
government bargained for and what the government received.
United States ex rel. Wall v. Circle C Constr., LLC, 813 F.3d 616 (6th Cir.
2016).
By Amanda Derryberry
In United States ex rel. Wall v. Circle C Constr., LLC, 813 F.3d 616 (6th Cir.
2016), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the proper
calculation of damages for claims made under the False Claims Act
(FCA), 31 U.S.C. § 3729.
Circle C Construction (“Circle C”) entered into a contract with the
United States government for the construction of several dozen
warehouses. The warehouses were constructed at the Fort Campbell
Army base located on the Kentucky and Tennessee border. The
contract required Circle C and any subcontractors to pay employees
above market wages pursuant to the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. § 3142.
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Circle C was also required to submit a weekly certification of compliance
to this wage rate for itself and any subcontractors.
Phase Tec, a subcontractor of Circle C, performed the electrical work
throughout the warehouses. During the course of construction, Phase
Tec did not comply with the required wage rate and underpaid its
electricians a total of $9,916. This underpayment resulted in false
certifications of compliance leaving Circle C liable to the government
under FCA. Subsequently, a Phase Tec employee brought an FCA case
on behalf of the United States against Circle C. Under the FCA, the
government may recover three times its actual damages. 31 U.S.C. §
3729(a)(1)(G).
The district court awarded the government damages of $762,894.54, or
three times the entire amount that the government paid for the electrical
work minus the $15,000 Phase Tec had already paid in a prior settlement
over the same issue. The court’s calculation was based on the
government’s theory that the entire $259,298 electrical project was
tainted by Phase Tec’s underpayment, leaving the warehouses valueless
to the government.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit rejected the lower courts calculation and
held the district court’s award of damages to be an abuse of discretion.
The court held that damages must be limited to only actual damages,
calculated as the “difference in value between what the government
bargained for and what the government received.” The court noted that
the government bargained for both the buildings and the payment of
Davis-Bacon Wages and received the buildings but only part of the
wages. Thus, the difference between the two, or the amount to make the
government whole amounted to the underpayment of $9,916.
The Sixth Circuit pointed to the obvious contradiction between the
“taint theory” and the government’s continued use of the buildings as
evidence that the electrical work was not valueless. The court credited
the accounting as creative yet inapplicable, because there was no
evidence of any taint to the contract or electrical work. The court noted
that the taint theory applies to cases where a contractor delivers
dangerous goods or goods plagued with some “unalterable moral taint”
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which renders them worthless. In cases involving worthless goods,
money damages would be insufficient to remedy the breach, yet, in this
situation, the difference between the contractually-required payment and
the payment actually paid was easily calculable, and the harm to the
government could be remedied through money damages.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals dismissed the government’s argument
that it would have withheld the entire payment had it been aware of
Phase Tec’s underpayment as extraneous. The court explains that FCA
damages are not calculated based on a “hypothetical scenario,” but rather
the calculated difference between the value received and the value
bargained for. As such, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
district court’s damage calculation was an abuse of discretion and that
the actual damages were $9,916, which totaled to $29,748 when tripled.
Less the $15,000 prior settlement payment, the found Circle C’s liability
significantly reduced to a total of $14,748.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision limits FCA damages to the calculated
difference in value between the goods or services the government
bargained for and what the government actually obtained. The court’s
decision will have significant implications on future FCA cases by
limiting the application of the taint theory to the few situations where
money goods would be insufficient to remedy the breach. The
precedent set by United States ex rel. Wall v. Circle C. Constr., LLC,
standardizes the government’s damage recovery and could dissuade
litigants from bringing meritless claims.

REAL ESTATE
The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that proof of an actual or
presumptive ouster is not a requirement in establishing title by
prescription as between co-tenants. Roberts v. Bailey, 470 S.W.3d 32
(Tenn. 2015).
By Susanne Kozma
In Roberts v. Bailey (Roberts II), 470 S.W.3d 32 (Tenn. 2015), the
Tennessee Supreme Court addressed whether, in proving title by
prescription, an individual must prove “presumptive ouster.” In Roberts
v. Bailey (Roberts I), No. E2013-01950-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 3778298
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(Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2014), the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that
establishing a presumptive ouster was a requirement for title by
prescription between co-tenants. In Roberts II, the Tennessee Supreme
Court reversed and held that while proof of an actual ouster is required
in claims of adverse possession between co-tenants, proof of an actual or
presumptive ouster is not required in claims for title by prescription.
The circumstances behind this case began in 1918, when spouses
N.B. (“N.B.”) and Pearl Bailey (“Pearl”) acquired two tracts of land
during a brief period in Tennessee legal history where the conveyance of
real property to spouses created a tenancy in common with no
survivorship rights. Presumably, however, N.B. and Pearl thought that
they entered a tenancy by the entirety with survivorship rights. After
N.B. died intestate, Pearl proceeded to use and treat their property as if
she had full title despite the fact that N.B.’s interest in the property had
passed under intestacy to his and Pearl’s four children.
Over a period of about forty years, Pearl and her four children operated
under the belief that Pearl had obtained complete ownership of the
property after N.B.’s death. Pearl transferred certain segments of the
property to some of her children, and in turn those children also
transferred sections of property to their siblings and children. By 2009,
Robert W. Bailey, the son of N.B. and Pearl, believed that he and his two
children (“The Baileys”) had complete ownership over one full tract of
land (“James Farm”). The Baileys would have been correct if not for the
law that made Pearl and N.B. tenants in common with no survivorship
rights. In actuality, upon N.B.’s death, fifty percent of the ownership in
the two tracts of property, including James Farm, had passed to the four
children.
The Baileys learned of the defect in their title to James Farm while
defending a suit to establish boundary lines against third parties. After
learning of the defect, the Baileys filed a third-party complaint to quiet
title for James Farm against the descendants of Naomi Bailey Littleton
(the “Littletons”). The Baileys initially argued that they had full
ownership of James Farm because it had been the actual intention of
N.B. and Pearl to create a tenancy by the entirety. Both the trial court
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and the Tennessee Court of Appeals rejected the Baileys’ argument. On
remand to the trial court, the Baileys amended their third-party
complaint and asserted that they had fee simple title in the land through
the doctrine of prescription. The trial court granted summary judgment
to the Littletons and held that the Baileys had failed to establish title by
prescription because the Littleton’s ignorance of their interest in the
property qualified as a “disability” that prevented the Littletons from
pursuing their rights. The Baileys again appealed, and the Tennessee
Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds. The court of appeals
found that the Littleton’s ignorance of their property interest did not
qualify as a disability, but that the Baileys had still failed to establish a
presumptive ouster of the Littletons, and therefore had failed to acquire
prescriptive title.
The Tennessee Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the
Littleton’s ignorance of their property interest was not a disability and
that, in the doctrine of prescriptive title, a showing of actual or
presumptive ouster is not required. The court reversed the decision of
the court of appeals and remanded the cause to the trial court. In
reaching its decision, the court cited Marr’s Heirs v. Gilliam, 41 Tenn. 488
(1860), where the Supreme Court of Tennessee recognized the doctrine
of title by prescription between co-tenants. The court also cited England
v. England, No.E2011-02094-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 4503434, at *5-6
(Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2012), in which the Tennessee Court of Appeals
articulated that a prescriptive holder acquired prescriptive title when 1)
he or she had been in “exclusive and uninterrupted possession of the
land for a period of twenty years or more,” 2) the co-tenants had not
been under any disability to assert their rights during that period, and 3)
the prescriptive holder’s occupancy occurred without the co-tenant’s
implied or actual permission.
In applying this test to the Baileys’ case, the court quickly found
that the Baileys had satisfied the first element because they had been in
exclusive and uninterrupted possession of James Farm for over twenty
years. As for the second element, the court agreed with the court of
appeals that “disability” did not include ignorance of a property interest,
but was limited to incidents of minority or incapacity. Finally, the court
found that the Baileys’ possession of James Farm was without the
Littletons’ permission, and that therefore the Baileys had established
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prescriptive title. In reaching this last point, the court reiterated that the
“primary difference” between title by prescription and adverse
possession is that “adverse possession requires proof of an ‘actual ouster’
of co-tenants, whereas title by prescription does not.”
The court’s decision in Roberts v. Bailey, 470 S.W.3d 32 (Tenn.
2015), clarifies prior Tennessee case law and firmly establishes that a
fundamental difference between the doctrine of adverse possession and
the doctrine of title by prescription is that, in the latter, the holder of
property need not prove actual ouster of a co-tenant. In future title by
prescription claims, a holder of property need only satisfy the elements
laid out in England v. England and is not required to prove actual or
presumptive ouster of a co-tenant. For practitioners, the court’s decision
provides clarity as to the fundamental difference between adverse
possession and title by prescription and offers clearer strategic elements
in choosing which avenue to pursue.

SECURITIES
The Tennessee Supreme Court adopts the Tooley standard under
Delaware law to determine whether a shareholder’s claim is direct
or derivative. Keller v. Estate of McRedmond, 495 S.W.3d 852 (Tenn.
2016).
J. Logan Wilson
After a deadlocked vote among sibling shareholders, the Chancery Court
for Davidson County, Tennessee, ordered that a closely held
corporation, McRedmond Brothers, Incorporated (“MBI”), be dissolved
and its assets sold at auction to the highest bidder. Stephen
McRedmond (“Stephen”), along with two of his sisters, Anita and Linda
(collectively, the “Buyers”), entered into an asset purchase agreement for
all of the business’s assets after placing a winning bid at auction. The
Buyers also formed and capitalized a new corporation, McRedmond
Feed Company, Incorporated (“McRedmond Feed”), to serve as the
designated receiver of the business’s assets at closing.
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The trial court then entered an order approving the sale of the business’s
assets to the Buyers, and ordered all of the current officers and directors
of the business’s assets, including Stephen and his brother Louis
Anthony McRedmond (“Louie”), to conduct MBI’s business only in the
usual, regular, and ordinary course, preserve its organizational structure,
and preserve its goodwill and relationships with customers, employees,
and all others having business relationships with the firm. However,
during the bidding process for MBI’s assets until he surrendered control
at closing, Louie began preparations to open a competing business by
filing a charter of incorporation for his new business, soliciting
employees and customers, and nearly depleting MBI’s entire inventory.
After learning of Louie’s actions, the Buyers filed a counterclaim against
Louie in the ongoing dissolution proceedings. Their claims can be
grouped into three general categories: “(1) Louie’s willful and intentional
violation of the trial court’s orders, (2) Louie’s breach of his fiduciary
duty to the original MBI, and (3) Louie’s intentional interference with
business relations.” The Buyers did not include McRedmond Feed as a
plaintiff, nor did they include the original MBI or Louie’s competing
business as a defendant. The trial court awarded damages to the Buyers
based on Louie’s violation of the court’s orders, intentional interference
with business relations, and breaches of fiduciary duty. The Tennessee
Court of Appeals then reversed the trial court’s opinion in its entirety,
holding that the Buyers’ claims belonged to McRedmond Feed and
should be brought on its behalf in a shareholder derivative action (not as
a direct private action claim by and for the shareholders themselves).
On grant of the Buyers’ application for permission to appeal, the
Tennessee Supreme Court determined the proper standard for deciding
whether a claim brought by shareholders of a corporation is direct or
derivative in nature. The court first explained that derivative suits by
shareholders seek to redress wrongs to the corporation, often by
corporate insiders, such as a director or officer’s breach of his or her
fiduciary duty. On the other hand, direct suits involve an injury to the
shareholder as an individual, such as the deprivation of voting rights or
the right to inspect corporate books, as well as wrongful inducement to
selling stock or direct victimization by fraud.
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The court expressly rejected its previous standard for determining
whether a claim is derivative or direct. That prior standard had come
from Hadden v. City of Gatlinburg, 746 S.W.2d 687 (Tenn. 1988). The
court explained that the Hadden standard was confusing to many
practitioners and judges and chose to instead adopt the standard used by
the Delaware Supreme Court in Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc.,
845 A.2d 1031 (Del. 2004). Tooley states that the direct versus derivative
determination turns solely on two questions: “(1) who suffered the
alleged harm (the corporation or the suing stockholders, individually);
and (2) who would receive the benefit of any recovery or other remedy
(the corporation or the stockholders, individually)?” The Tooley standard
also requires that the claimed direct injury must be independent of any
alleged injury to the corporation. The court also approves of the use of
other jurisdictions’ guidance regarding and analysis of the Tooley standard
in determining cases under Tennessee law.
The court then analyzes the Buyers’ three general categories of claims
under the Tooley standard. Under the Tooley standard, the Buyers must
demonstrate that the duty breached was owed to them and that they can
prevail without showing an injury to the corporation.
First, the court held that the Buyers have a valid direct action for Louie’s
willful and intentional violation of the trial court’s orders. The court
explained that the trial court order violation claim was essentially an
action for civil contempt or breach of contract because the order was
entered expressly for the benefit of the Buyers. McRedmond Feed was
only a third-party beneficiary of the order, so the claim rightfully
belonged to the Buyers.
Next, the court held that claims originating from Louie’s alleged breach
of his fiduciary duty to the original MBI belonged to the corporation, not
the Buyers, and could only be asserted directly by the corporation or
derivatively by its shareholders. The court explained that the Buyers
essentially claimed that Louie engaged in management and self-dealing at
the expense of the corporation, rather than the Buyers themselves. As a
result, any claim resulting from a breach of fiduciary duty from
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mismanagement or self-dealing belongs to the corporation, not its
shareholders.
Finally, the court held that the claims originating from Louie’s
intentional interference with business relations belonged to McRedmond
Feed and could only be asserted derivatively. Because Louie’s operation
of his new corporation did not begin until after the closing of the
purchase, the court found that any interference must be related to the
interruption of McRedmond Feed’s business relations.
The court also denied the claim from the Buyers that they should be
treated like partners instead of shareholders due to the corporation’s
closely held, subchapter-S status. Unlike corporate shareholders,
partners in a partnership are harmed individually when the partnership is
harmed, and thus may assert any claim for injury to the partnership as a
direct action. Citing Hadden, the court explained that the Buyers could
not disregard the corporate form at their convenience, even as a closely
held corporation. As a result, the court affirmed in part and reversed in
part the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the
court of appeals.
Generally, this case serves as a lesson that all attorneys need to be
attentive as to what parties will be entitled to seek a remedy in the event
of noncompliance with contractual terms or court orders. Commercial
litigators should take note of the importance of the adoption of the
Delaware standard in determining direct versus derivative standing for
shareholders’ claims under Tennessee law. Under this opinion, Delaware
law, as well as other states’ court opinions interpreting the Tooley
standard, will serve as more persuasive authority in Tennessee courts
than previous Tennessee decisions in the area (which were decided under
a different legal standard). Litigators should also make sure that the
correct plaintiffs and defendants are named in their cases based on this
decision. Additionally, transactional attorneys should note that the many
years of litigation in this case could have been avoided had the original
shareholders’ agreement included an appropriate deadlock provision.
Transactional attorneys should also ensure that court orders issued
pursuant to an asset sale are expressly entered for the benefit of the
buyers and their designees, and that the buyers and their designees are
parties to any contract they wish to later enforce.
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